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Climate Balkanization: Dormant Commerce and the 
Limits of State Energy Policy 
Jonathan H. Adler* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, states have enacted an array of policies to 
encourage the use of renewable energy sources and otherwise 
reduce the carbon intensity of energy production.1 Such policies 
range from subsidies for desired forms of energy, to market-share 
mandates, to direct regulation of emissions.2 As has become 
somewhat traditional, California has been particularly aggressive 
in its adoption of regulatory measures.3 
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 ∗ Jonathan H. Adler is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and 
Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation at the Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law and a Senior Fellow at the Property & Environment 
Research Center. This paper was prepared for the Lone Mountain Forum on 
“Energy Policy: Political, Legal, and Economic Issues,” December 5–8, 2013, 
Lone Mountain Ranch, in Big Sky, Montana. 
 1. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Climate Policy and the United States System 
of Divided Powers: Dealing with Carbon Leakage and Regulatory Linkage, 3 
TRANSNATIONAL ENVTL. L. 31, 34 (2014), (“By 2006, every state had enacted 
legislation relevant to climate change.”); Uma Outka, Environmental Law and 
Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1693 
(2012) (noting state and local initiatives to promote renewable energy); James 
W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, FORDHAM L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 13) (“[S]tates remain the focus of energy 
regulation and the most important energy policy innovators.”). See also 
generally Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions to Global 
Problems: State, Local, and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to 
Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 15 (2004). 
 2. For a survey of relevant state policies, see David R. Hodas, State 
Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 303–40 (Jody Freeman 
& Michael Gerrard eds., 2d ed. 2014). See also Lesley K. McAllister, Cap-and-
Trade, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 341–74 (Jody Freeman & 
Michael Gerrard eds., 2d ed. 2014) (discussing state-level emission trading 
policies). 
 3. See Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental 
Leadership: California's Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 65 
(2013). See also Kimberly Cobo, California Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006: Meaningfully Decreasing Greenhouse Gas Emissions or Merely A Set of 
Empty Promises?, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 447, 453 (2007); infra Part IV.B. See 
also generally DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 259–60 (1995) (discussing the 
“California effect,” whereby California’s leadership in environmental regulation 
has encouraged replication in other jurisdictions). 
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Many of these state-level policies have been justified as efforts 
to address the threat of global climate change by reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the energy sector.4 Until 
the Supreme Court determined that GHGs could be regulated as 
“pollutants” under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 2007,5 the federal 
government had failed to take any meaningful regulatory actions to 
reduce GHG emissions.6 This lack of action left room for the states 
to fill.7 Indeed, by some accounts, state regulatory efforts were 
driven, in part, by a desire to spur federal climate legislation.8 
                                                                                                             
 4. See Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for 
Climate Change Legislation, 84 TULANE L. REV. 379, 401 (2009) (“[S]tate and 
local governments have taken a particularly aggressive approach to addressing 
climate change, in many instances beating federal regulators and Congress to the 
punch.”); BARRY G. RABE, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
GREENHOUSE AND STATEHOUSE: THE EVOLVING STATE ROLE IN CLIMATE 
CHANGE ix (2002) (“The trend is unmistakably towards more states taking an 
active role in climate change.”). 
 5. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007). 
 6. See Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives for State and 
Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 119, 119 (2008). Since 
2008, however, the federal government has proposed and promulgated several 
regulations controlling emissions of greenhouse gases. See also Reconsideration of 
Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act 
Permitting Programs (Timing Rule), 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71), invalidated by Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. 
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (Tailpipe Rule), 75 Fed. 
Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. 
pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule (Tailoring Rule), 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (June 3, 2010) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71), invalidated by Util. Air Regulatory 
Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act 
(Endangerment Finding), 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. ch. 1); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (proposed June 18, 
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified 
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 34960 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). For an 
overview of federal regulatory initiatives triggered by Massachusetts v. EPA, see 
Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas 
Regulation under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 421 
(2011).  
 7. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 282 (2003) (noting that many states 
“have quietly begun to fill the void in leadership that some believe exists at the 
national level”). 
 8. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 6, at 126–27 (providing examples of 
state and local governments pooling resources to compel the federal government 
to pursue regulatory action on climate change). See also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., 
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Through the imposition of mandates on what sorts of energy 
may be produced or sold, state regulatory efforts have imposed 
burdens on interstate energy markets. In some cases, these burdens 
are explicit, as when states have privileged in-state energy sources 
at the expense of out-of-state producers or sellers.9 In other cases, 
these burdens are the inevitable consequence of state efforts to 
reduce the environmental impacts of energy consumed within the 
state.10 Such restrictions, and their associated burdens on interstate 
commerce, raise serious constitutional questions. Under the so-
called “Dormant Commerce Clause,”11 state regulations that 
discriminate against out-of-state actors are presumptively 
unconstitutional, as are state regulations that seek to extra-
territorialize a state’s regulatory choices. Even purportedly non-
discriminatory measures may be suspect if they impose an 
excessive burden on interstate commerce in relation to the in-state 
benefits they produce. 
Advocates of these policies argue that such effects are the 
necessary consequence of state efforts to reduce GHG emissions.12 
                                                                                                             
 
Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative 
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007) (stating that state laws “spur interest 
groups to raise issues that might otherwise never receive congressional 
attention”); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: 
The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985) 
(noting that much of federal environmental law is a result of special interest 
groups opposing inconsistent and stringent state regulatory standards). 
 9. See infra notes 192–98 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Coleman, supra note 1; Yvonne Gross, Kyoto, Congress, or Bust: 
The Constitutional Invalidity of State CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs, 28 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 205, 222 (2005) (“State-level approaches to regulating 
GHGs, while laudable, will inevitably impact interstate markets, thereby 
implicating the constitutional limits on state action imposed by the Commerce 
Clause.”). 
 11. The title “Dormant Commerce Clause” can be attributed to Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). See Sidney M. 
Wolf, The Solid Waste Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce Clause, 39 S.D. 
L. REV. 529, 569 n.88 (1994). In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall, in 
dicta, wrote that the power to regulate interstate commerce “can never be 
exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, 
or lie dormant.” 22 U.S. at 189. See also Michael S. Greve, The Dormant 
Commerce Clause as an Ex Ante Rule, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 241, 241 (2007) 
(noting criticism of doctrine as “debatable inference at best and a wholesale 
judicial invention at worst”).  
 12. See, e.g., Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 337 (2013); Alexandra Klass 
& Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, SAN. DIEGO J. OF CLIMATE & ENERGY L. (forthcoming 2014) 
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Climate change, after all, is a “super wicked” problem, and GHG 
emissions are ubiquitous.13 Mitigating the threat of climate change 
requires aggressive measures, including the comprehensive 
regulation of energy production, distribution, and use.14 If states 
are to be effective in trying to address climate change, advocates 
argue that incidental burdens on interstate commerce are 
inevitable.15 Yet, given that climate change is a global problem, no 
state on its own has the ability to have any meaningful effect on 
projected changes to the earth’s climate.16 Even if every state in the 
nation were to adopt these sorts of policies, projections of future 
warming due to anthropogenic emissions of GHGs would remain 
largely unchanged.17 Nevertheless, should every state adopt such 
policies, the nation’s energy markets could become quite 
balkanized.18 Whether states can proceed on their current course 
will be determined by courts’ willingness to enforce traditional 
constitutional constraints on discriminatory and extraterritorial 
state legislation. 
Part I of this Article briefly surveys the state role in energy 
regulation. Part II outlines the constitutional constraints that may 
                                                                                                             
 
[hereinafter Klass & Henley, Energy Policy]; Michael Barsa & David A. Dana, 
A Climate Change Lens on the Dormant Commerce Clause, Lifecycle GHG 
Taxes, and In-State RPS Requirements, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 
69 (2014). 
 13. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: 
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 
1159–61 (2009) (describing climate change as a “super wicked” problem). 
 14. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2009). 
 15. Gross, supra note 10. (finding that “[s]tate-level approaches to 
regulating GHGs, while laudable, will inevitably impact interstate markets, 
thereby implicating the constitutional limits on state action imposed by the 
Commerce Clause.”). 
 16. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of 
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007). 
 17. On the enormity of the challenge of mitigating global climate change 
through emission reductions, see Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: 
Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (2011). See also Robert D. Atkinson & Darrene Hackler, 
Ten Myths of Addressing Global Warming and the Green Economy, INFO. TECH. 
& INNOVATION FOUND. 1 (June 2010), www.itif.org/files/2010-green-economy-
myths.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z2VM-S2X4 (noting that “the magnitude 
of change needed is much larger than many realize[;] many conventional 
solutions simply won’t achieve the global scale needed.”).   
 18. For an in-depth look as to how regulation balkanized gasoline markets 
and the related consequences, see generally Andrew P. Morriss & Nathaniel 
Stewart, Market Fragmenting Regulation: Why Gasoline Costs so Much (and 
Why it's Going to Cost Even More), 72 BROOK. L. REV. 939 (2007).  
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limit such regulation by states, including the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. Part III discusses how courts have applied the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to energy-related regulation by states. Part IV 
looks at contemporary state policies that may raise particular 
Dormant Commerce Clause concerns due to privileging in-state 
interests and discriminating against out-of-state energy producers. 
In the end, the extent to which the Dormant Commerce Clause 
constrains state energy and climate policies will depend upon the 
level of enthusiasm the Supreme Court retains for enforcing 
traditional norms against anti-competitive state action. 
I. STATE-LEVEL ENERGY POLICIES 
Both the federal and state governments play a role in the 
regulation of energy exploration, production, and distribution, 
along with the consequential environmental effects. In 
environmental policy more broadly, there is active debate on the 
optimal distribution of regulatory authority between the federal and 
state governments.19 Federal authority to regulate interstate 
commerce necessarily extends to the regulation of energy markets, 
and is understood to include federal authority to regulate the 
environmental consequences of commercial and industrial activity, 
                                                                                                             
 19. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More 
Adaptive Through Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1377 (2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental 
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 130 (2005) [hereinafter Adler, Mismatch]; 
DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON (2005); 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, 
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 206 (2002); Wallace E. 
Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 22 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002); 
Kirsten Engel & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Federalism in the 
United States: The Risks of Devolution, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 137 (Daniel C. Esty & 
Damien Geradin eds., 2001); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental 
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001); Rena I. 
Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351 
(2000); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 570 (1996); HENRY BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM 
TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); Peter P. Swire, The Race to 
Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition 
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996). For 
a survey of the empirical literature on jurisdictional choice in environmental 
law, see Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Federalism: A Survey of the 
Empirical Literature, CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
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including energy exploration and consumption.20 Energy 
development and production is heavily regulated by a suite of 
federal environmental laws, including, among others, the CAA,21 
the Clean Water Act (CWA),22 and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act.23 State and local governments, nonetheless, retain 
their historic authority over most land use and are directly involved 
in the regulation of utilities.24  
Whereas most early environmental protection measures were 
enacted at the state or local level, the federal government has been 
actively involved in the regulation of energy since the early part of 
the 20th century. In 1920, Congress enacted the Federal Water 
Power Act25 (FWPA), which later became Part I of the Federal 
Power Act (FPA).26 The FWPA created the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC) and provided for the licensing of hydroelectric 
projects on navigable waters.27 Fifteen years later, Congress 
enacted Part II of the FPA, authorizing the FPC to regulate 
wholesale electricity rates,28 followed shortly thereafter by the 
Natural Gas Act, authorizing the FPC to regulate rates for 
interstate gas pipelines.29 Over time, the FPC’s jurisdiction over 
interstate energy markets expanded, and the agency was redubbed 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1977.30 
Subsequent laws encouraged independent power production and 
                                                                                                             
 20. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005) [hereinafter 
Adler, Judicial Federalism]. 
 21. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. 2011)). 
 22. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). 
 23. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k 
(2012)). 
 24. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 
n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state 
activity.”). 
 25. Federal Water Power Act (FWPA), ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–823 (2012)). 
 26. See Federal Power Act (FPA), Pub. L. No. 71-412, 46 Stat. 797 (1930) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 27. See id. (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 792 (2012)) (creating the 
Federal Power Commission). See also id. (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§797a (2012)) (providing for congressional authorization of licenses for 
hydroelectric projects).  
 28. See Federal Power Act, ch. 687, tit. II, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).  
 29. See Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717w (2012)). 
 30. See 49 U.S.C. § 60502 (2012). 
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the development of alternative energy resources.31 In the late 
1970s, FERC also began to take steps toward the deregulation of at 
least some wholesale energy markets.32  
Although the federal government has a significant regulatory 
role, much energy regulation occurs at the state level. State 
agencies are heavily involved in land use issues related to energy 
extraction and development, as are local governments.33 State and 
local agencies oversee the siting of facilities and transmission 
lines.34 Even where the federal government has assumed a role in 
transmission line siting, state agencies retain a prominent role.35 
Utility rates and practices are also governed by Public Utility 
Commissions (PUCs) in each state.36  
In recent years, states have become particularly active in the 
regulation of energy for environmental purposes.37 These measures 
range from regulating emissions to imposing fees or charges to 
encourage the development of less-polluting forms of energy.38 
Some state PUCs now require consideration of environmental costs 
in the evaluation of new energy projects, and a majority of states 
                                                                                                             
 31. See, e.g., Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 
95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2602-3211 (2005)). See 
also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the 
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 469 (2005). 
 32. For example, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, enacted as part of the 
National Energy Act of 1978, authorized the partial deregulation of natural gas 
prices. See 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012). 
 33. In many states, there are legal and policy disputes over the proper 
allocation of regulatory authority between the state and local governments. See 
generally John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, 
Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995 
(2013). 
 34. For an examination of the divide between federal and state governments 
over transmission siting and its implications for renewable energy, see 
Alexandra B. Klass and Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges 
for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1827–
31 (2012). 
 35. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009). 
Note that there is less of a local role in the siting of pipelines.  
 36. Every state has a PUC. See Regulatory Commissions, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, http://www.naruc.org/Commissions/Commis 
sionsList.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/VL8X-CWQG (last visited Oct. 8, 
2014). 
 37. See Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: 
Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 259, 259–60 (2008). 
 38. Id. at 260.  
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have renewable portfolio standards.39 This degree of state 
regulatory activism is not surprising given that state governments 
have often enacted environmental regulations in advance of the 
federal government.40 
Many of the newer measures adopted by state governments 
purport to address the threat of global climate change by reducing 
the carbon intensity of energy produced or used within the state, or 
by otherwise reducing GHG emissions.41 These measures are 
prompted, in part, by the federal government’s failure to adopt a 
comprehensive climate policy.42 State-level action on climate 
change is unlikely, in itself, to have much impact on atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs or projected rates of future warming.43 
Nonetheless, the level of state activity is significant and could raise 
important constitutional questions about the scope of state 
regulatory authority. 
One feature—or bug—of some state policies is their attempt to 
address the out-of-state effects of in-state energy consumption. 
Some states that have adopted renewable portfolio standards, for 
example, have sought to privilege in-state renewable power 
producers so as to ensure that at least some portion of the 
economic benefits from such mandates are captured within the 
state.44 For example, in its low-carbon fuel standards, California 
has sought to adopt a “lifecycle” approach to energy regulation that 
accounts for all of the environmental effects of fuel production, 
including the extraction and processing of the relevant energy 
source wherever such activities occur.45 California and other states 
                                                                                                             
 39. See id. (referring to some states that use “environmental externality 
values” in evaluating energy projects). See also id. at 260 n.10 (noting that a 
majority of states already have renewable portfolio standards). 
 40. See, e.g., Elliott et al., supra note 8, at 316; Jonathan H. Adler, The 
Fable of Federal Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in 
Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 93, 96–100 (2004). 
 41. See Thomas D. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach 
to Climate Change Policy in the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of 
Government and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227, 239 (2008) 
(summarizing state climate initiatives).  
 42. See, e.g., Engel & Orbach, supra note 6. Some states have also resorted 
to litigation in their efforts to spur greater federal action on climate change. See, 
e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. 
Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).  
 43. Wiener, supra note 16, at 1963 (noting it is “well understood that these 
state-level efforts, even those of large states such as California, will have little 
impact on global emissions and hence little impact on global climate.”). 
 44. See infra Parts III and IV.  
 45. The purpose of California’s low carbon fuel standard is to reduce GHG 
emissions by reducing “full fuel cycle, carbon intensity” of transportation fuel 
used in California. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2014). California defines 
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have also sought to prevent states from gaining a competitive 
advantage due to their regulatory measures.46  
Measures addressing the effects of out-of-state energy 
production are justified by the need to address carbon “leakage.”47 
Specifically, there is a concern that imposing stringent emission 
controls or carbon limits in one jurisdiction will have “the 
frustrating and perverse effect” of “reducing carbon in one place” 
only to make “it pop up somewhere else.”48 In the energy context, 
the fear is that imposing costly regulatory measures in one 
jurisdiction will induce companies to shift their operations to, or 
source energy and other factors of production from, other, less-
regulated jurisdictions. If electric utilities in one state are required 
to reduce their GHG emissions or derive a larger share of the 
electricity they sell from more costly sources, they may be at a 
competitive disadvantage against utilities in other jurisdictions. 
Regulations limiting the carbon intensity of in-state fuel production 
may induce consumers to obtain fuels from out-of-state producers. 
Due to the resulting leakage, any benefits resulting from a state’s 
efforts to reduce emissions within its own borders may be offset by 
an increase in emissions elsewhere. Relatedly, some fear that state 
policies to encourage the development of renewable energy will 
drive such development to other jurisdictions, potentially leaving 
in-state consumers with higher energy bills without the offsetting 
economic benefits of in-state development.49 
California’s climate efforts are particularly ambitious. In 2006, 
California enacted the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), 
obligating the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to impose, 
among other things, a statewide cap-and-trade regime for GHG 
emissions and to adopt low-carbon fuel standards for all gasoline 
sold within the state.50 Both components of AB 32 have been the 
                                                                                                             
 
“carbon intensity” to include full “lifecycle” GHG emissions. CAL. CODE REGS. 
tit. 17, § 95481(a)(16) (2014).  
 46. See infra Parts III and IV.  
 47. James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 87, 106–14 (2014). 
 48. Farber, supra note 1, at 37.  
 49. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate 
Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 843 
(2008) (summarizing the economic risks of leakage).  
 50. See Assemb. B. 32, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (codified at 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (2006)). 
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subject of significant controversy and litigation, including 
constitutional challenges.51 
Although California has a history of ambitious environmental 
regulation, there are reasons to doubt that states will adopt optimal 
environmental policies to address cross-boundary environmental 
problems, particularly climate change.52 Climate change is 
anything but a local or regional problem. To the contrary, global 
climate change is just that—a global environmental concern.53 The 
benefits from state or local policies that mitigate the risks posed by 
climate change are dispersed globally and cannot be captured 
within the enacting jurisdiction. State or local jurisdictions wishing 
to combat global climate change are confronted with an archetypal 
“commons” problem.54 The global climate is a vast global 
commons to which everyone contributes GHG emissions. 
Emissions anywhere on the globe contribute to the increase in 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and the eventual warming of 
the atmosphere. Any state that reduces emissions within its 
jurisdiction will bear the cost of such reductions, but it will not 
reap equivalent benefits. Whatever benefits accrue from GHG 
emission controls accrue globally.55 No state, acting alone, is 
capable of adopting emission controls capable of making a dent in 
global emissions, let alone global atmospheric concentrations of 
GHGs.56 Even working together, states are not capable of reducing 
projected climate change and its anticipated effects to any 
meaningful degree.57 As a consequence, states have every 
                                                                                                             
 51. See generally Thomas Alcorn, The Constitutionality of California’s 
Cap-and-Trade Program and Recommendations for Design of Future State 
Programs, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87 (2013); Peter M. Morrissette & 
Robert D. Infelise, A Review of Legal Challenges to California’s Greenhouse 
Gas Cap-and-Trade Regulations, 33 WESTLAW J. ENVTL. 18 (2013). 
 52. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 
DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) (“Given the inherent difficulties in regulation by any 
single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear case for 
shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of 
governance.”). See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate 
Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996); Adler, Mismatch 
supra note 19.  
 53. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 10–11 (2001). 
 54. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 
1243 (1968) (describing the commons problem). 
 55. Wiener, supra note 16, at 1965 (“[L]ocal abatement actions pose local 
costs, yet deliver essentially no local climate benefits.”). 
 56. Id. at 1966 (“[N]o state could effectively control its own ambient level 
of carbon dioxide or other GHGs, because that ambient level is determined by 
the worldwide concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere.”). 
 57. Id. at 1963.  
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incentive to “free ride” on the efforts of their neighbors rather than 
suffer costs that will yield few internal benefits or to use climate 
concerns as a cover for special-interest legislation. However 
capable states may be at addressing more localized environmental 
concerns, their comparative advantage may end at the border. 
There is a mismatch between a state’s capability to comprehend 
and control local matters, on the one hand, and the scale of some 
transboundary concerns, climate change in particular, on the 
other.58 
The mismatch between the problem of climate change and 
available solutions may explain why some states have adopted 
climate-related policies that appear to privilege in-state energy 
producers and, where possible, externalize compliance costs to 
other jurisdictions. States are more likely to adopt meaningful 
emission reductions if they can externalize the costs of such 
measures to other jurisdictions and capture the pecuniary benefits. 
Such regional rent-seeking has been well documented in 
environmental law59 and can occur specifically in the climate 
context.60 Consider the various public nuisance lawsuits filed by 
state attorney generals against out-of-state firms.61 State officials 
who file such suits, get the political benefits of appearing to take 
action against climate change without having to bear the costs of 
imposing economic burdens on in-state firms. More broadly, state-
                                                                                                             
 58. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and 
Virtues of Climate Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443 (2008) 
[hereinafter Adler, Hothouse Flowers]. 
 59. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-Seeking 
Behind the Green Curtain, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND 
THE GREEN CURTAIN 1, 6–9 (Terry L. Anderson ed. 2000) (summarizing notable 
examples of regional rent-seeking in environmental law). For other examples of 
rent-seeking in environmental law, see Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental 
Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of 
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 898 (1999); 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. 
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds. 1992). 
 60. See Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global 
Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 207 (2002). Indeed, the “most 
ambitious energy and climate-change legislation ever introduced in Congress,” 
the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), perhaps better known as 
the Waxman-Markey Bill, was “fat with compromises, carve-outs, concessions 
and out-and-out gifts intended to win the votes of wavering lawmakers and the 
support of powerful industries.” John M. Broder, With Something for Everyone, 
Climate Bill Passed, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A20.  
 61. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F.Supp.2d 265 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309, rev’d, 131 S.Ct. 813; California v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
17, 2007). 
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level climate policies that benefit in-state firms and constituencies 
may be easier to enact than those that produce more dispersed 
benefits. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
The United States Constitution constrains the sorts of energy 
and environmental policies that may be adopted by both the federal 
and state governments.62 The constitutional system of “dual 
sovereignty” recognizes the “separate and independent autonomy” 
of the states.63 At the same time, this system constrains what states 
may do by placing express and implied structural limits on state 
authority64 and on the interjurisdictional competition that the 
Constitution’s structure creates. 
A. Limited and Enumerated Federal Powers 
 A core component of the constitutional structure is the idea 
that the powers of the federal government are limited to those 
enumerated in the Constitution itself.65 The bulk of these powers 
are enumerated in Article I, section 8.66 These include the powers 
to borrow and coin money, establish uniform laws governing 
naturalization and bankruptcy, and—most significantly for the 
regulation of energy and environmental concerns—the power to 
regulate commerce “among the several States.”67 Article I, section 
8 also authorizes Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts, and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
                                                                                                             
 62. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 38 
(2004) (noting the Constitution’s division of authority “creates obstacles to 
states' enacting laws that are more protective of the environment”). 
 63. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). 
 64. See Erwin Chemerinsky, et al., California, Climate Change and the 
Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 10653 (2007) (“[T]he U.S. Constitution 
restricts states’ power to address certain problems and particularly limits the 
strategies states can employ to further the interests of their citizens.”). 
 65. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“The federal 
government ‘is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.’”) 
(citation omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 
(1819)). This is not a new proposition. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; 
and that those limits may not be mistake, or forgotten, the constitution is 
written.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (“The enumeration 
presupposes something not enumerated.”).  
 66. Other powers may be found in the enforcement clauses of the Civil War 
Amendments, among other places. 
 67. U.S. CONST., art. I, §8.  
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Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”68 As 
interpreted by the courts, this empowers Congress to fund those 
projects and programs that Congress believes will advance the 
“general Welfare” of the United States.69 Further, the Constitution 
also vests Congress with the power to “make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the other 
powers enumerated in the Constitution.70 
Taken together, the powers enumerated in Article I, section 8 
grant Congress ample authority to address energy and 
environmental concerns. The aforementioned commerce power in 
particular is quite expansive. Under current doctrine, the commerce 
power (as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) 
enables Congress to reach nearly all manners of economic 
activity.71 As interpreted by the courts, this authority is sufficient 
to sustain most federal environmental regulations on the books 
today.72 Yet, this authority is not without limits. As the Supreme 
Court recently reaffirmed in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, “the National Government possesses only 
limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.”73 
Although many federal environmental statutes authorize some 
degree of land use regulation, the Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to authorize expansive federal regulation in this area. As 
the Supreme Court noted in FERC v. Mississippi, the “regulation 
of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.”74 It will not 
be subsumed by federal legislation lightly.75 
                                                                                                             
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 1. 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64–65 (1936). 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 18.  
 71. Specifically, under United States v. Lopez, Congress has the authority to 
regulate “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” “the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce,” including persons and things in such commerce, and 
“those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” 514 U.S. 549, 
558–59 (1995). As applied in Lopez and subsequent cases, Congress may 
regulate even rather trivial instances of intra-state economic activity as part of a 
broader regulatory scheme governing economic activity. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 72. See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 20, at 404–21. 
 73. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
 74. 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982). 
 75. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 
737–38 (2006); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC 558 F.3d 304, 310–12 (4th 
Cir. 2009). 
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B. Constraints on State Power 
The primary constitutional limits on federal power derive from 
the delegation of limited and enumerated powers.76 The federal 
government only has those powers that are delegated to it. The 
states, on the other hand, have all those powers not delegated to the 
federal government or constrained by other constitutional 
provisions.77 Put another way, whereas the federal government’s 
powers are limited and enumerated, the states possess a residual 
and plenary police power.78  
1. Supremacy Clause 
The federal government’s powers are limited, but they are also 
supreme. Article VI of the Constitution provides that the federal 
Constitution and “the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof” are “the supreme law of the land.”79 
Thus, where federal and state laws conflict, federal law prevails.  
A consequence of the Supremacy Clause is that the federal 
government retains the authority to preempt state regulation of 
those matters within the reach of federal regulatory authority. 
Preemption may be express or implied.80 Express preemption 
occurs when Congress enacts legislation that explicitly overrides or 
bars the application of state law.81 Implied preemption, on the 
                                                                                                             
 76. Both the federal and state governments are constrained by the Bill of 
Rights and the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments as well. With some 
exceptions, these limitations do not impose meaningful constraints on energy 
and environmental regulation. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and 
the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 421-22 
(2005) (discussing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (stating that 
the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that would 
authorize enactment of every type of legislation”). 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. VI : 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
 80. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 96, 98 (1992) 
(“Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and ‘is compelled whether 
Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly 
contained in its structure and purpose.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. 
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).  
 81. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). 
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other hand, occurs when there is some degree of tension or 
incompatibility between federal and state law. This may occur 
when a federal statute covers an entire field of law so pervasively 
that there is no room for additional state or local regulation—so-
called “field preemption”82—or when it is costly, if not impossible, 
for a regulated entity to comply with both federal law and state law 
simultaneously—so-called “conflict preemption.”83 Courts are 
generally reluctant to find preemption without either an express 
claim of preemption by Congress, or some other indication of 
implied preemption, such as a direct conflict between federal and 
state law.84 
2. Dormant Commerce Clause 
Congress retains the authority to use its enumerated powers to 
preempt or limit state laws that conflict with or are otherwise 
contrary to federal objectives. Yet even when Congress fails to act, 
state laws will be held invalid if they impermissibly burden 
interstate commerce. The same Commerce Clause that authorizes 
Congress to regulate commerce “among the several states” has also 
been interpreted by the courts to constrain state regulation that 
unduly interferes with such commerce.85  
This “negative” aspect of the Commerce Clause—the so-called 
“Dormant Commerce Clause”—is “driven by a concern about 
‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to 
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state 
competitors.’”86 As the Supreme Court explained in Granholm v. 
Heald, a “central concern” motivating the Constitutional 
Convention was the proliferation of state-level barriers impeding 
the flow of commerce across state lines.87 The Framers realized 
that “in order to succeed the new Union would have to avoid the 
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued 
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the 
                                                                                                             
 82. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012). 
 83. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002). 
 84. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 533 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); 
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 616 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 85. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337 (2008) 
(“[A]lthough its terms do not expressly restrain ‘the several states’ in any way, 
we have sensed a negative implication in the provision since the early days.”). 
 86. Id. at 337–38 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269, 273–74 (1988)).  
 87. 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005). 
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Articles of Confederation.”88 Thus, the Supreme Court’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine has evolved to “effectuate[] the 
Framers’ purpose to prevent a State from retreating into economic 
isolation.”89 Current Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is also 
particularly suspicious of extraterritorial legislation, which is 
understood as laws that attempt to “control conduct beyond the 
boundary of a state.”90 As with the rule against discriminatory state 
legislation, this rule operates to limit the potential for “conflicting 
legislation.”91 
Under current doctrine, state laws that discriminate against out-
of-state actors are subject to a form of strict scrutiny and are 
“virtually per se invalid.”92 States cannot discriminate against out-
of-state actors or articles of commerce unless there is a “reason, 
apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”93 A 
discriminatory state law, such as a law that imposes higher taxes or 
regulatory burdens on goods produced out-of-state, will only be 
upheld if the state can show that the challenged provision 
“advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately 
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”94 As the 
Court has explained, a state may not adopt a discriminatory state 
law “if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to 
conserve legitimate local interests, are available.”95 
Non-discriminatory state laws may be invalidated under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause as well. Under the Pike test, named for 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., it is unconstitutional for a state to enact 
a law that imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is 
“excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”96 For instance, 
the Supreme Court has invalidated state laws that unnecessarily 
burdened commerce through the state, such as state laws requiring 
trucks on state highways to be shorter than those allowed in 
neighboring states97 or those requiring a specific type of 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id.  
 89. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996) (quoting Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995)). 
 90. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989). 
 91. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 358 (1887). 
 92. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 
(1994). 
 93. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978). 
 94. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101. 
 95. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
 96. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
 97. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 665 
(1981). See also S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 763 (1945) (invalidating a 
state limit on train length within the state). 
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mudguard.98 Both the prohibition of discrimination and the Pike 
test operate as default rules that may be altered by Congress 
through the exercise of its power to regulate commerce.99 
In recognition of the distinction between “[s]tates as market 
participants and [s]tates as market regulators,” the Court has 
created a “market-participant” exception to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.100 Under this exception, state entities are 
permitted to participate in markets, buying and selling goods and 
services or providing public goods, in a discriminatory fashion.101 
As the Court has explained, “Nothing in the purposes animating 
the Commerce Clause prohibits a State . . . from participating in 
the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over 
others.”102 For instance, a state agency may adopt purchasing 
policies that favor in-state businesses or provide services on 
preferential terms to in-state residents. 
For much of the past two centuries, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause has been a powerful check on state regulations that threaten 
to burden or constrain interstate commerce.103 The Supreme Court 
was particularly aggressive in its enforcement of the Commerce 
Clause’s “negative” aspects during the Burger and early Rehnquist 
Courts.104 In recent years, however, some Justices on the Supreme 
Court have expressed reservations about current Dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine,105 and the Court has taken a 
permissive view of state legislation designed to “protect 
governmental operations from out-of-state competition.”106 Both 
Justices Thomas and Scalia have expressed concerns about the use 
of an atextual doctrine to invalidate state laws.107 Concluding the 
                                                                                                             
 98. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S 520 (1959). 
 99. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) 
(rejecting, as against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, discriminatory 
state insurance regulations authorized by the McCarran-Ferguson Act). 
 100. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980). See also Hughes v. 
Alexandra Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
 101. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343 (2007). 
 102. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810 (footnote omitted).  
 103. See Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The “New 
Protectionism” and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
247, 248–49 (2013). 
 104. See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2003) [hereinafter Klein, Environmental 
Commerce Clause]. 
 105. See Williams & Denning, supra note 103, at 292.  
 106. See id. at 250. 
 107. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); United Haulers Assn, Inc. v. Oneida-Harkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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doctrine “has no basis in the Constitution and has proved 
unworkable in practice,” Justice Thomas would “discard” it 
entirely.108 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, adopts a more 
moderate view, agreeing to apply the doctrine “only when stare 
decisis compels” him to do so.109 Both of these Justices have also 
expressed concern about the Pike test, as it calls for the balancing 
of incommensurable values, a task to which neither believes courts 
are well suited.110 They may not be alone on the Court, as a 
majority of Justices has not struck down a state law on Pike 
grounds in over two decades, leading some commentators to 
predict the end of the Pike test.111 At the same time, the Court has 
appeared to back away from aggressive enforcement of the rule 
against extraterritorial legislation.112 If so, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, in the future, may pose less of a threat to state energy 
regulation than it has in the past.  
III. DORMANT COMMERCE, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
Environmental laws do not get a pass under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. The bar on discriminatory legislation applies 
unless, and until, such state measures are authorized by Congress. 
The Supreme Court has been quite explicit on this point. In City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, in which the Garden State sought to 
defend a prohibition on the import of out-of-state waste, the Court 
stressed that “all objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause 
protection.”113 This is as true of “goods” (widgets) as it is of 
“bads” (waste).114 Environmental claims can be used to mask base 
                                                                                                             
 108. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 109. Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 359 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part). 
 110. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 
U.S. 564, 619 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also United Haulers, 550 
U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 111. See Williams & Denning, supra note 103, at 304. 
 112. Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 979 (2013). 
 113. 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978). 
 114. See Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause threat to Market-
based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 
ECOL. L.Q. 243, 244–45 (1999) [hereinafter Engel, Electricity Deregulation] 
(“[T]he principle against protectionism in interstate trade applies to all articles 
traded in interstate commerce, including those related to the environment.”). See 
also Jonathan H. Adler, Waste & the Dormant Commerce Clause – A Reply 
(response to Richard Epstein), 3 GREEN BAG 2D 353, 354 (2000). 
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economic protectionism.115 Yet even if environmental preservation 
were the central purpose of a challenged state law, the Court has 
explained, “that would not be sufficient to uphold a discriminatory 
regulation.”116 
Since 1978, when the Court struck down New Jersey’s ban on 
the importation of out-of-state waste,117 the Court has rigorously 
applied the Dormant Commerce Clause bar against discriminatory 
state legislation to environmental measures whether the laws at 
issue concerned water, waste, or something else. Indeed, between 
1978 and 2000, the Court invalidated every state law defended on 
environmental protection grounds, save one118—a Maine law 
prohibiting the importation of out-of-state baitfish.119 Although 
discriminatory, Maine’s law survived because the asserted state 
interest—preventing the introduction of “parasites and nonnative 
species”120 that could threaten local fisheries—could not be readily 
addressed through a less discriminatory measure.121 Other 
environmental concerns, such as the potential harms from waste 
disposal or energy production, are readily addressed through the 
direct regulation of such harms, such as through emission controls 
and performance standards.122 Such concerns have not been 
deemed sufficient to justify discriminatory regulation.123 
                                                                                                             
 115. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988) 
(describing that the legitimate purpose of protecting public health as “merely an 
occasional and accidental effect” of the law’s main purpose: economic 
protectionism).  
 116. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 (1994). 
 117. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). 
 118. Klein, Environmental Commerce Clause, supra note 104, at 44 (noting 
that “[w]ith only one exception, the Court has invalidated every state law 
protecting water or land resources that it has considered between 1978 and the 
end of the twentieth century”) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)). 
While all of these laws may have been defended on environmental protection 
grounds, it is not clear whether they all served to enhance environmental 
protection. In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, for instance, the 
Supreme Court struck down a local solid waste flow control ordinance. 511 U.S. 
383, 384 (1994). This decision may have restricted local control over solid 
waste, but most major environmental groups also opposed legislative efforts in 
Congress to exempt such statutes from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. See 
Jonathan H. Adler, The Failure of Flow Control, 18 REG. 11, 13 (1995). 
 119. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986). 
 120. Id. at 141.  
 121. Id. at 151–52.  
 122. See New Energy Co. of Ind v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) 
(finding that “direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run 
afoul [of the DCC’s] prohibition . . .”). 
 123. See generally Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t. Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 
U.S. 93 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 
(1994). See also supra Part II.  
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The Court’s record has led some commentators to suggest “the 
modern Court has been consistently hostile to environmental 
regulation.”124 Given the Supreme Court’s willingness to uphold 
environmental laws in other contexts, and its authorization of 
expansive federal regulation in Massachusetts v. EPA,125 such a 
charge seems unwarranted.126 The Court is hostile to 
discriminatory legislation, whatever the context, and has been 
unwilling to bend modern Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine just 
because environmental protection is at stake. 
As already noted, the Court has made clear that the Dormant 
Commerce Clause applies to all manners of goods and services. If 
the presumptive rule against discriminatory state legislation applies 
to waste management services, as the Court has repeatedly held, 
there is no reason it would not apply to energy sources or 
electricity as well. Indeed, as the Supreme Court held in FERC v. 
Mississippi: “It is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of 
interstate commerce than electric energy, a product used in 
virtually every home and every commercial manufacturing 
facility.”127 
It is not surprising then that the Supreme Court has applied 
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to invalidate state measures 
restricting interstate commerce in energy supplies. In New Energy 
Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, for example, a unanimous Supreme 
Court threw out an Ohio policy favoring in-state ethanol 
                                                                                                             
 124. Klein, Environmental Commerce Clause, supra note 104, at 4. Perhaps 
ironically, among the Justices most skeptical of the Court’s use of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to invalidate state regulation is the Justice most often accused 
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 125. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 126. See Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 37 
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L. REV. 943, 967 (2009). See also EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 
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131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011). Indeed, specifically with regard to the Endangered 
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the Endangered Species Act. See Stewart & Jasper Orchards v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 
1163 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 498 (2011); Ala.-Tombigbee 
Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 1097 (2008); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 
F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Gibbs v. 
Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 
531 U.S. 1145 (2001); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 
(D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). 
 127. 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982). 
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producers.128 In 1981, Ohio enacted a statute providing fuel dealers 
with tax credits for using ethanol; the tax credits could then be 
used against the state’s motor vehicle fuel sales tax.129 In 1984, 
Ohio limited the tax credit to the use of ethanol produced in Ohio 
or in states that offered a reciprocal tax credit to Ohio-made 
ethanol.130 This revision, the Court held, clearly constituted 
discriminatory legislation under the Dormant Commerce Clause, as 
it “explicitly deprives certain products of available beneficial tax 
treatment because they are made in certain other states.”131 That 
Ohio only withheld favorable tax treatment and did not seek to 
close its borders entirely to ethanol from states without reciprocal 
policies was of no consequence. It was sufficient that the law at 
issue imposed “an economic disadvantage upon out-of-state 
sellers.”132 As Justice Scalia explained in his opinion for the Court: 
“Where discrimination is patent, as it is here, neither widespread 
advantage to in-state interests nor a widespread disadvantage to 
out-of-state competitors need be shown.”133 
Ohio sought to defend its policy on the ground that it was not 
discriminatory but instead an effort to encourage other states to 
provide similarly favorable treatment to ethanol.134 Should all such 
states enact such policies, Ohio reasoned, there would be no 
discrimination. This was a clever argument, but none of the 
Justices bit. As Justice Scalia noted, prior cases had made it quite 
clear that a state could not “use the threat of economic isolation to 
force sister States” to adopt reciprocal or otherwise favorable 
policies.135 Even where states claimed they were seeking to 
conserve vital in-state resources, the Court did not shrink from 
labeling such laws “facially discriminatory.”136 
State regulatory efforts to encourage the use of in-state coal 
have not fared much better than Ohio’s in-state ethanol 
preferences. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the Court threw out an 
Oklahoma law mandating that at least ten percent of the coal 
                                                                                                             
 128. 486 U.S. 269, 280 (1988). 
 129. Id. at 272; Act of June 10, 1981, § 1, 1981 Ohio Laws 1693, 1731–32 
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5735.145 (West 2007)). 
 130. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 272; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5735.145 
(West 2007). 
 131. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 274. 
 132. Id. at 275. 
 133. Id. at 276. 
 134. Id. at 274. 
 135. Id. (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 378 
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burned in coal-fired utilities come from Oklahoma mines.137 
Wyoming challenged the law, on behalf of its coal producers, as 
Oklahoma utilities had obtained nearly all of their coal from 
Wyoming.138 As far as the Court was concerned, this was “not a 
close case.”139 A law expressly reserving a portion of the 
Oklahoma coal market for Oklahoma coal could not be anything 
but protectionist and discriminatory. That only ten percent of the 
market was affected was irrelevant: “The volume of commerce 
affected measures only the extent of the discrimination; it is of no 
relevance to the determination whether a State has discriminated 
against interstate commerce.”140 Quoting New Energy Co., the 
Court reiterated that where there is such “patent” discrimination, 
there is no need to show “widespread advantage to in-state 
interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-of-state interests” to 
subject the law to the virtual per se rule of invalidity.141 
Following the Supreme Court’s lead in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck 
down efforts by Illinois and Indiana legislators to protect local 
production of high-sulfur coal from low-sulfur coal mined in 
western states.142 The 1977 CAA Amendments had protected high-
sulfur coal by mandating the installation of scrubbers in newly 
constructed coal-fired power plants.143 This eliminated the 
incentive for Midwestern utilities to use low-sulfur coal, as it was 
more expensive than the high-sulfur coal, closer to home, and 
could no longer be used to satisfy environmental requirements.144 
In 1990, however, Congress replaced the scrubber requirement 
with a more performance-driven regulatory regime.145 This change 
                                                                                                             
 137. 502 U.S. 437, 461 (1992). Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice 
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the grounds that the state of Wyoming 
lacked standing to challenge Oklahoma’s law. Id. at 461 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion offered no judgment on the 
underlying Dormant Commerce Clause question. Id. at 461–77.  
 138. Id. at 445. 
 139. Id. at 455 n.12. 
 140. Id. at 455. 
 141. Id. (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276–77 
(1988)). 
 142. See Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller (Alliance I), 44 F.3d 591, 596–97 
(7th Cir. 1995); Alliance for Clean Coal v. Bayh (Alliance II), 72 F.3d 556, 560–
61 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 143. See Alliance I, 44 F.3d at 593. See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & 
WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR (1981); 1977 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 109(e), 91 Stat. 685, 701 (1977). 
 144. Alliance I, 44 F.3d at 593. 
 145. See id. See also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). 
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made high-sulfur coal more cost competitive and “meant the end of 
the salad days for high-sulfur coal-producing states.”146 
In response to Congress’s revisions to the CAA, Illinois and 
Indiana enacted laws designed to protect in-state coal producers 
from low-sulfur coal competition.147 In Illinois, this took the form 
of, among other things, requiring the state’s largest power plants to 
install scrubbers, guaranteeing that the cost of these scrubbers 
could be included in the utilities’ rate base and mandating state 
approval before a utility could reduce its use of Illinois coal by 
more than ten percent.148 The Seventh Circuit readily concluded 
that this form of “encouragement”149 was traditional economic 
protectionism in another guise.150 Requiring utilities to install 
scrubbers eliminated any incentive to use low-sulfur coal as a 
means of complying with relevant air pollution regulations, and 
thus had the same economic effect as a tariff on the importation of 
such coal from out-of-state.151 Such efforts to protect local industry 
“from the rigors of interstate competition,” the court concluded, 
were “the hallmark of economic protection that the Commerce 
Clause prohibits.”152 
Indiana’s effort to protect in-state coal producers was less 
aggressive, but no more successful. The Indiana statute subjected 
utilities that failed to ensure continued use of Indiana coal to 
greater regulatory scrutiny.153 Specifically, it provided that for the 
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission to approve a utility’s plan 
to comply with the requirements of the federal CAA, it had to find 
that the plan would provide “for continued or increased use of 
Indiana coal,” unless this failure could be justified “by economic 
considerations including the effects in the regions of Indiana in 
which the mining of coal provides employment and in the service 
territory of the public utility.”154 As with Illinois’s law, the Seventh 
Circuit saw a clear effort to protect in-state producers from out-of-
                                                                                                             
 146. Alliance I, 44 F.3d at 593. 
 147. Illinois Coal Act, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-402.1 (1993); Indiana 
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state competition. That the law may have been less rigid was of no 
consequence, as it still discriminated “against interstate commerce 
based solely on geographic origin.”155 As the court explained: 
While we do not doubt that a healthy Indiana mining 
industry and a fully employed workforce may aid Indiana 
in achieving a low cost electrical service, that is not a 
legitimate justification for discrimination against interstate 
commerce. Protection of local, or even regional, industry is 
simply not a legislative action that is consistent with the 
Commerce Clause.156 
Insofar as the Illinois or Indiana legislatures desired to aid in-state 
coal producers, they could not use discriminatory legislation to 
achieve this end.157  
Restrictions on energy exports are no more permissible than 
limitations on imports. Thus, in 1982, the Court invalidated a 
decision by the New Hampshire Public Utility Commission (PUC) 
denying a utility the permission to sell hydroelectric power 
generated within the state to out-of-state customers.158 The New 
England Power Company (NEPC) was a regional utility that 
operated several hydroelectric generating stations in New 
Hampshire.159 Because the state’s largest electric utility, the Public 
Service Company of New Hampshire, had higher generating costs, 
the PUC concluded that if NEPC were required to sell all of its in-
state hydroelectric power within New Hampshire, it would reduce 
local electric rates.160 Such a requirement is impermissible, the 
Court concluded, because the Dormant Commerce Clause 
“precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a 
preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural 
resources located within its borders or to the products derived 
therefrom.”161 Hydroelectric power, like widgets or waste disposal 
services, is a “privately owned article[] of trade” beyond the reach 
                                                                                                             
 155. Alliance II, 72 F.3d at 560. 
 156. Id. 
 157. A somewhat milder effort to encourage the use of in-state coal by the 
Commonwealth of Virginia fared better against legal challenge, albeit in state 
court. See Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm’n, 675 S.E.2d 458 (Va. 
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 158. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 344 (1982). 
 159. Id. at 333–34.  
 160. Id. at 336. 
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of such protectionist legislation.162 Although Congress retains the 
authority to authorize such restrictions, states may not enact such 
trade restrictions on their own. Similarly, under the market 
participant exception, a state could construct or acquire its own 
hydroelectric facilities and operate them for the benefit of state 
residents or simply provide subsidies for desired energy sources 
from its budget.163 Again, however, it cannot achieve this goal 
through the regulation of private actors. 
Some state and local governments have adopted laws 
restricting the through traffic of energy sources, including coal.164 
Such policies, even if not preempted by federal laws governing 
transportation, may also run afoul of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. As noted above, the Pike test prohibits state laws that 
impose a disproportionate burden on interstate commerce in 
relation to any putative local benefits.165 Under this test, laws that 
have the purpose or effect of obstructing the transportation of fuel 
sources through a state would be suspect, unless they could be 
justified as necessary to protect identifiable local concerns. Most 
suits challenging these sorts of restrictions, however, have been 
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 163. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) 
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THE SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html 
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178 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
resolved without reaching the constitutional question.166 The 
Federal Railway Safety Act, for instance, preempts state and local 
laws that obstruct or burden interstate rail traffic, providing courts 
with a statutory basis for invalidating such state policies.167 Yet 
even if such laws are not preempted, they could still be struck 
down. 
 
IV. VULNERABLE STATE ENERGY POLICIES 
 
States have enacted a wide range of policies designed to reduce 
the adverse environmental consequences of energy production and 
encourage greater use of renewable or low-carbon energy sources. 
Many of these policies, including direct subsidies to alternative 
energy producers and regulations directly controlling pollution or 
other environmental harms, are perfectly constitutional. Other 
policies, however, including some renewable portfolio standards 
and California’s low-carbon fuel standards, may run afoul of 
current Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.168 
A. Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Over the past decade, a majority of states has adopted a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) to encourage the use of 
renewable energy sources and reduce GHG emissions.169 An RPS, 
sometimes referred to as a “Renewable Electricity Standard” or 
RES, is a requirement that utilities and other retail sellers of 
electricity source a minimum percentage of their power from a 
defined set of “renewable” sources.170 Under existing programs, 
                                                                                                             
 166. See, e.g., Duluth, Winnipeg, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Orr, 529 F.3d 
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jurisdiction preempted by Federal Railway Safety Act); CSX Trans., Inc. v. 
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 167. See Duluth, Winnipeg, & Pac. Ry. Co. 529 F.3d at 799–800; CSX 
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the minimum amount of renewable power required ranges from 
4% to 30%.171 Some programs impose a minimum requirement 
that is scheduled to increase over time.172 RPS requirements are 
necessary to induce greater use of renewable power because 
renewable power tends to be significantly more expensive than 
nonrenewable alternatives.173 RPS proponents hope that requiring 
the greater use of renewable power sources will boost the market 
for renewable power and help bend the renewable cost curve 
downward.174  
Iowa enacted the first state RPS in 1983.175 It would be more 
than ten years before another state (Nevada) would follow.176 After 
the turn of the century, however, RPSs began to proliferate. There 
were seven state RPSs in 2002,177 and 28 by 2009, accounting for 
approximately 50% of the electricity load in the United States.178 
By January 2012, the Energy Information Administration reported 
that 30 states and the District of Columbia had enacted enforceable 
RPS laws, and another seven states had adopted non-binding 
renewable portfolio goals.179 Some proponents of renewable power 
hope that the adoption of state-level RPS standards might 
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eventually spur the adoption of a federal RPS standard.180 Thus far, 
legislation to create a federal RPS has been proposed, but not yet 
adopted.181 
In a typical RPS program, electricity retailers may produce the 
electricity themselves or purchase qualifying renewable electricity 
from other producers or wholesalers.182 Under most RPS programs, 
retailers may also purchase tradable renewable energy credits (also 
known as renewable energy certificates or RECs) to fulfill their 
RPS obligations.183 The use of RECs facilitates the development of 
renewable power by, among other things, relieving renewable 
power producers “from the need to deliver the renewable 
electricity in real time to the ultimate users.”184 The use of RECs 
can also lower the costs of complying with RPS requirements.185 
“RECs have become the dominant mechanism of RPS 
compliance.”186  
Different states have adopted different definitions for what 
constitutes “renewable” power, as well as what qualifies as an 
REC, how long the credits last, and whether they may be 
“banked.”187 Solar, wind, biomass, and gas captured from landfills 
typically qualify as renewable power sources under state RPS 
programs.188 In some states, the RPS also includes a specified 
“carve-out” that must be filled with solar power.189 Other sources 
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of renewable power, such as tidal power and municipal waste, only 
qualify in some states.190 Some sources of power that are not 
typically considered to be renewable, nonetheless, qualify under 
some state programs. Pennsylvania, for example, has a particularly 
capacious definition of what constitutes “renewable power,” 
counting fossil fuel gasification, distributed generation from non-
renewable sources, and co-generation.191 
Many states have adopted definitions of “renewable” power in 
their RPS programs that privilege in-state producers.192 These in-
state privileges can take many forms. Massachusetts, for example, 
created an RPS Solar Carve-Out requiring a minimum percentage 
of the RPS requirement to be filled with power generated from 
newly-constructed, in-state solar photovoltaic projects.193 Four 
other states—California, Colorado, North Carolina, and Ohio—
limit the portion of their RPS that may be met with out-of-state 
power.194 Other states privilege in-state producers by adopting 
REC “multipliers” for in-state producers, under which the volume 
of credits from renewable power generation is greater for in-state 
producers.195 Still, others provide multipliers or preferences for in-
state producers that utilize in-state labor or in-state materials.196 
Some states also adopt regional preferences, privileging producers 
in a given region, such as those defined by a regional transmission 
organization, rather than a single state.197 Only seven states with 
RPS programs lack any in-state or geographically-defined 
preference.198 
In-state production requirements are sometimes justified as an 
attempt to offset some of the economic costs of mandating the 
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purchase of more expensive renewable power by providing local 
economic benefits.199 It is also likely that the adoption of 
preferences for in-state renewable power has facilitated the passage 
of RPS programs by providing benefits to concentrated in-state 
economic interests. In this regard, at least some state RPS 
requirements may be seen as the result of the sort of “Baptist and 
Bootlegger” coalition common in environmental policy.200 
Whatever the purported justification of such requirements, 
policies privileging in-state renewable power sources raise obvious 
Dormant Commerce Clause problems and have already been 
challenged in federal court.201 As noted above, courts have readily 
struck down state regulations that privilege in-state power over 
out-of-state alternatives.202 In 2010, Transcanada Power Marketing 
sued the Commonwealth of Massachusetts over its RPS, and 
Massachusetts promptly settled, avoiding a potentially adverse 
court judgment.203 Other litigation against allegedly discriminatory 
RPS programs is ongoing.204 Whatever the justification, there is 
little question that limitations on the use of out-of-state power to 
satisfy a state’s RPS requirement qualify as discriminatory 
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the jobs and commercial revenue created by construction and operation of new 
renewable energy generation facilities, can at least partially offset RPS 
programs’ overall costs to state citizens.”). Although such requirements may 
offset some of the economic costs of imposing an RPS, it is rare that the 
economic benefits will rival the economic costs of the program. See ANDREW P. 
MORRISS ET AL., THE FALSE PROMISE OF GREEN ENERGY (2011). 
 200. On the “Baptist and Bootlegger” phenomenon, in general, see Bruce 
Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 
REG. 12 (1983); Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect: The 
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REG. 5 (1999). See also Yandle & Buck, supra note 60. 
 201. See Ferrey, supra note 187; Klass & Henley, Energy Policy, supra note 
12. See also Lee & Duane, supra note 12. 
 202. See supra Part III. 
 203. Partial Settlement Agreement, MA. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY ENVTL. 
AFFAIRS (2010), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/settle 
ment-agreement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7T3J-5K2E; Michael Flett, 
Massachusetts and TransCanada Reach Partial Settlement, FLETTEXCHANGE 
(June 3, 2010), http://markets.flettexchange.com/2010/06/03/massachusetts-and-
transcanada-reach-partial-settlement/, archived at http://perma.cc/JC83-2T2G.  
 204. Ferrey, supra note 187, at 137–42. In particular, on May 9, 2014, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado summarily dismissed, among 
other things, a broad Dormant Commerce Clause challenge against Colorado’s 
RES. Energy & Env't Legal Inst. v. Epel, No. 11-cv-00859-WJM-BNB, 2014 
WL 1874977 (D. Colo. May 9, 2014). Appellate review is forthcoming. Press 
Release, Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., Colorado RES Decision Paves Way for 
10th District Appeal (May 9, 2014), available at http://eelegal.org/?p=2972, 
archived at http://perma.cc/C4UH-2H7A. 
2014] CLIMATE  BALKANIZATION 183 
 
 
 
measures. As Judge Richard Posner summarily concluded in a 
recent decision, a state may not “discriminate against out-of-state 
renewable energy,” such as by refusing to credit renewable energy 
produced out-of-state toward a state-based RPS.205 
Lower courts appear to share Judge Posner’s view. In April 
2014, a federal district court in Minnesota invalidated portions of 
Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act, which sought to limit 
increases in “statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions” by 
barring utilities from importing electricity from out-of-state coal-
fired power plants.206 Minnesota’s policy, the court concluded, was 
impermissibly extraterritorial because it effectively regulated out-
of-state transactions.207 This result was unavoidable because the 
electricity grid “does not recognize state boundaries” and, because 
of the nature of the electricity grid, the law would restrict 
electricity contracts between out-of-state producers and 
consumers.208 
If states are not allowed to discriminate against out-of-state 
coal or ethanol producers, there is little reason to suspect they can 
discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy producers. 
Advocates of such policies argue that states adopting in-state 
preferences, such as limits on the use of out-of-state RECs, are 
“guilty of nothing more than trying to ensure clean air in an 
efficient manner.”209 Yet, if the goal is to ensure “clean air” in the 
most efficient manner possible, the state policy would focus on 
emissions directly, rather than rely upon the development of 
alternative energy sources as a proxy. As the courts have held in 
other contexts, environmental concerns justify environmental 
measures, not discriminatory measures against out-of-state 
actors.210 
The Dormant Commerce Clause, as traditionally enforced, 
should prevent states from adopting facially discriminatory RPS 
policies. Whatever the merits of RPS policies generally,211 the 
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interests they serve can be advanced through non-discriminatory 
measures. Clever states, however, may find ways to define the 
relevant requirements in a facially neutral manner that nonetheless 
inures to the benefit of in-state interests.212 For example, it may be 
possible to define eligible renewable energy sources in ways that 
take advantage of a state’s comparative advantages, perhaps due to 
unique geographic or other features.213 Yet, if states are too 
aggressive in this regard, the policies could nonetheless fall to 
Dormant Commerce scrutiny should courts recognize such policies 
as having the “purpose or effect” of discriminating against out-of-
state actors.214 
If the goal of RPS programs is to encourage the production of 
renewable energy and reduce energy-related pollution, including 
pollution caused by the emission of GHGs, these interests are 
readily advanced through non-discriminatory legislation. The 
problem for states, however, may be that many of these benefits 
extend beyond state boundaries, and are thus not readily captured 
within the state. This “mismatch” between the costs of such 
programs—which will fall upon in-state consumers—and their 
benefits, which will be dispersed—could make it difficult to enact 
RPS laws at the state level.215 While the use of discriminatory 
                                                                                                             
 
RPSs are inefficient and will “reduce[] emissions at [a] higher cost than 
necessary.” Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart 
Policy or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 81 (2008). After all, 
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Commerce Clause and Implications for State Renewable Portfolio Standard 
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construction date and the qualifying size of the hydroelectric projects. See 
Coleman, supra note 1.  
 214. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984). 
 215. See generally Adler, Hothouse Flowers, supra note 58. 
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provisions may help explain why so many states have enacted RPS 
policies, not all states have resorted to such measures.  
B. California Low-Carbon Fuel Standard 
California has long been a leader in the enactment of 
environmental policies. Throughout the post-WWII period, 
California has adopted environmental regulations in advance of 
most other states, as well as the federal government, often inspiring 
imitators or spurring federal action.216 This is true in the context of 
energy and climate policy as well. California has not only adopted 
an RPS, it has also enacted a wide-ranging climate bill, AB 32, 
which requires the imposition of a stationary source cap-and-trade 
regime and controls on the carbon content of fuels.217 While all of 
these measures are somewhat controversial, the latter has raised 
particularly challenging Dormant Commerce Clause concerns. 
As noted above, in 2006 California enacted AB 32—the Global 
Warming Solutions Act. Concluding that “[g]lobal warming poses 
a serious threat to the economic well-being, public health, natural 
resources, and environment of California,”218 the California 
legislature resolved to reduce the state’s GHG emissions to 1990 
levels by the year 2020.219 As part of this effort, the law instructed 
the California Air Resource Board (CARB) to enact regulations to 
reduce GHG emissions from the transportation sector,220 which is 
alone responsible for an estimated 40% of the state’s GHG 
emissions.221  
CARB pursued its mission with three measures. First, CARB 
adopted a series of GHG emission standards for new motor 
vehicles, something regulators in California alone are permitted to 
do.222 Second, CARB sought to reduce annual vehicle miles 
traveled through a series of planning and land use measures.223 
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Third, and most significantly for this article, CARB adopted fuel 
standards to reduce the overall carbon content of transportation 
fuels used within the state.224 Specifically, CARB imposed a 
declining annual cap on the average carbon intensity of 
transportation fuels sold within the state.225 As with an RPS, 
regulated entities may comply themselves or acquire credits to 
satisfy their regulatory requirements.226 Thus, each fuel blender 
must ensure that the average carbon intensity of its fuel remains 
below the annual limit, either by blending fuels with a lower 
carbon content or by acquiring credits from other regulated entities 
that have exceeded their regulatory requirements.  
Because GHGs emitted anywhere have the same effect on the 
atmosphere, CARB elected to use a “lifecycle analysis” to 
determine the carbon intensity of transportation fuels.227 That is, 
the carbon intensity of a given transportation fuel is determined by 
the aggregate amount of carbon dioxide-equivalent that is emitted 
through the “lifecycle” of the fuel—from its initial extraction or 
production to its eventual combustion in a vehicle and everything 
in between, including any processing or transporting of the fuel.228 
“Without lifecycle analysis, all GHGs emitted before the fuel 
enters a vehicle’s gas tank would be excluded from California’s 
regulation.”229 By the same token, a fuel standard that focuses on 
in-state emissions could fail to account for low-carbon production 
processes or transportation methods. As a consequence, failure to 
account for the lifecycle of transportation fuels could cause 
California’s regulations to actually increase the very emissions it is 
seeking to control.  
By seeking to account for emissions generated out-of-state, 
CARB’s low-carbon fuel standards immediately raise a red flag 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. On its face, such a 
requirement would appear to be an impermissible extraterritorial 
regulation. In addition, CARB implemented its fuel standards in 
ways that appear to be facially discriminatory and trumpeted these 
                                                                                                             
 
California Environmental Quality Act with the California Global Warming 
Solutions Act, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 71 (2009). 
 224. CAL.CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–90 (2011). 
 225. Id. at § 95482. 
 226. Id. at § 95845. 
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Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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effects when promulgating its rules. In making the case for its own 
rules, CARB determined that reducing the volume of fuels 
imported from other states would, itself, advance the state’s 
regulatory goals, and CARB explained how encouraging the 
construction of in-state biorefineries would increase California’s 
tax base and increase local employment.230 
In order to determine the carbon intensity of a given fuel, 
CARB adopted a model developed at the Argonne National 
Laboratory, Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy 
Use in Transportation (GREET), that estimates the lifecycle carbon 
intensity of a fuel based on its type, the feedstock used, the source 
of energy used during processing, method of transportation to 
market, and so on.231 This model generates a default value used for 
determining a fuels’ carbon intensity, though individual producers 
retain the ability to propose an alternative, individualized 
assessment at their own expense.232 Not only does this model 
effectively penalize fuels for being transported—by incorporating 
the energy used in such transportation as part of the carbon 
intensity value—but it also adopts default values based upon the 
location of where a given fuel is produced.  
In the case of ethanol, CARB attributes greater carbon intensity 
to the production of ethanol in the Midwest than to the production 
of ethanol in California because Midwestern utilities use more coal 
than do California utilities.233 On the other hand, because it is more 
costly (and energy intensive) to transport the crops used to produce 
ethanol than to transport ethanol itself, Midwestern ethanol is 
benefitted insofar as it is produced closer to the source of the crops 
than is California ethanol.234 The end result of accounting for 
geographic location, however, appears to benefit California 
producers: “California’s combination of more efficient plants and 
greater access to low-carbon electricity outweighs Midwest 
ethanol’s lower transportation emissions.”235 
In the case of crude oil, CARB crafted its regulations so as to 
try to encourage the use of alternative fuels.236 Here again, 
however, state regulators adopted measures that appear 
discriminatory in that they advantage at least some in-state 
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producers. First, CARB divided crude oil sources as “existing” or 
“emerging” based upon whether they already served the California 
market.237 CARB also divided crude sources into High Carbon 
Intensity Crude Oil (HCICO) and Non-HCICO.238 All existing 
crude oil sources were assigned the average carbon intensity value 
for all crude oil in 2006.239 This intensity was also assigned to 
emerging Non-HCICO.240 For emerging HCICO sources, all of 
which could be assumed to have carbon intensities at least as high 
as the 2006 average, their actual carbon intensity will be used.241  
Out-of-state producers challenged CARB’s regulatory 
standards in 2009, and at the time of this writing, the litigation is 
still ongoing.242 In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, a 
district court judge held that portions of CARB’s low-carbon fuel 
standards were impermissibly discriminatory.243 Specifically, the 
court found that the standard “impermissibly discriminates against 
out-of-state corn ethanol and impermissibly regulates 
extraterritorially,” and issued a preliminary injunction barring 
enforcement of the standard.244 The district court also held that 
while CARB’s crude oil regulations were not facially 
discriminatory, they were discriminatory in purpose and effect.245  
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the ethanol 
provisions were neither facially discriminatory nor impermissibly 
extraterritorial, but the court also remanded the case for 
consideration of whether the ethanol provisions had the purpose or 
effect of discriminating and, if not, whether the ethanol rules were 
unduly burdensome on interstate commerce in violation of the Pike 
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test.246 One of the judges on the panel dissented in part, concluding 
that the ethanol provisions were facially discriminatory in that the 
carbon intensity of ethanol fuels sold in California are expressly a 
function of where that ethanol is produced.247 The Ninth Circuit 
also unanimously reversed the district court’s conclusion that the 
crude oil standards were discriminatory in purpose or effect.248 
The district court and dissenting judge on the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the ethanol regulations were facially discriminatory 
because the table delineating the carbon intensity of different 
ethanol production processes expressly relied upon the location of 
production as a factor in determining its carbon intensity.249 “It is 
not necessary to look beyond the text of the statute to determine 
that it discriminates against interstate commerce,” the Supreme 
Court explained in Camps/Newfound Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison.250 Relying upon this admonition, Judges O’Neill and 
Murguia simply looked at the relevant rules and found an 
impermissible location-based constraint.251 For instance, Table 6 
assigned different default carbon intensity values to Midwestern 
and California ethanol producers utilizing the same production 
processes.252 As Judge Murguia wrote in her dissent on the Ninth 
Circuit, “Table 6 differentiates between in-state and out-of-state 
ethanol, according more preferential treatment to the former at the 
expense of the latter.”253  
The Ninth Circuit majority saw things differently and stressed 
“the grave need in this context for state experimentation.”254 
Assigning different carbon intensity values to fuels produced in 
different locations would not be discriminatory, the majority 
concluded, if there was “some reason, apart from their origin, to 
treat them differently.”255 If, as the Supreme Court suggested in 
Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality,256 
a state could charge a differential fee for the disposal of out-of-
state waste if such waste “did impose higher costs” on the disposal 
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state, then it should be permissible for California to penalize more 
carbon-intensive, out-of-state fuels if they are, in fact, more carbon 
intensive.257 “California’s reasonable decision to use regional 
categories in its default pathways and in the text of Table 6 does 
not transform its evenhanded treatment of fuels based on their 
carbon intensities into forbidden discrimination.”258 
Both the district court and dissenting judges accepted that 
California had a legitimate local purpose in adopting its 
regulations—addressing the threat of climate change259—but 
concluded California had less discriminatory means of addressing 
this concern, such as by conducting individualized lifecycle 
assessments for different fuel producers, instead of relying upon 
location-based default values.260 Such an alternative may have 
been “more difficult or costly,” but it would also not have been 
facially discriminatory.261  
An alternative approach may have made California’s rules 
facially neutral to satisfy the district court and dissenting judges, 
but the potential problems of extraterritoriality and discriminatory 
effect would have remained. In calculating the carbon intensity of 
different ethanol sources, California not only considered the 
emissions directly resulting from each stage of the production 
process, but also those from the indirect emissions generated by, 
for example, anticipated changes in land use resulting from 
demand for crops to be used in ethanol.262 California’s 
consideration of the energy sources used in crop cultivation and 
ethanol production also implicitly penalized ethanol producers for 
operating in jurisdictions with less stringent GHG emission 
policies than those in place in the Golden State. If the rule against 
extraterritorial regulation remains in force, this would seem to be a 
problem.  
Although it acknowledged that California’s rules gave 
favorable treatment to some in-state crude oil sources, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the differential treatment on the grounds that the 
rules did not systematically advantage in-state over out-of-state 
producers.263 Specifically, one source of in-state crude was 
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assigned a carbon intensity as an “existing” HCICO less than half 
of its actual carbon intensity.264 While other in-state sources did 
not receive equally favorable treatment, no out-of-state source was 
similarly advantaged, some were disadvantaged, and assigned 
carbon intensity values above their actual levels.265  
The Ninth Circuit concluded that CARB’s treatment of crude 
oil was permissible because CARB did not systematically 
advantage in-state producers and penalize out-of-state producers. 
However, this analysis miscomprehends the relevant inquiry. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly found state and local measures to be 
impermissibly protectionist when they have advantaged a subset of 
local producers, such as those in or around a given locality.266 
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not exclusively concerned 
with blanket preferences for local-over-foreign products, nor is it 
necessary for advantaged producers to represent a large share of 
the relevant market.267 
The Rocky Mountain Farmers Union cases present particularly 
challenging Dormant Commerce Clause issues. California’s low-
carbon fuel regulations unquestionably reach out-of-state 
conduct—how given motor fuels are created—and penalize energy 
consumption for the transportation of such fuels. In California’s 
defense, accounting for all energy use in the development, 
production, and transportation of motor fuels is necessary to limit 
GHG emissions resulting from fuel consumption. Were California 
to ignore emissions throughout the “lifecycle,” and instead adopt 
regulations solely governing the production and combustion of fuel 
within the state, it is possible that the state’s regulations would 
actually produce a net increase in carbon emissions. This could 
occur if, for instance, out-of-state fuel producers gained a 
competitive advantage by using less costly, but more carbon-
intensive, feed stocks and production processes than fuels 
regulated in the state. Then again, the actual regulations California 
adopted appear to turn on geographical location more than may 
have been necessary to account for lifecycle emissions.  
One argument in California’s defense is particularly telling. 
Defenders of the fuel standards note that Congress has embraced 
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reliance upon lifecycle analysis.268 Perhaps it has, but this does not 
address the Dormant Commerce Clause concern. The underlying 
premise of the doctrine is that there are some sorts of regulatory 
measures that are exclusively within the province of the national 
government and off limits to the states. Insofar as addressing GHG 
emissions requires considering the full lifecycle emissions of fuels 
and products—and insofar as such consideration requires 
sanctioning transportation and evaluating the implications of a 
given geographic source location—climate policies of the sort 
California envisions may well be beyond its reach.  
In January 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit denied the challengers’ petition for rehearing en 
banc,269 and in June, the Supreme Court denied both the fuel 
producers and California’s petitions for certiorari.270 This is not the 
end of the matter, however, as the case will continue in district 
court. As Judge Gould explained in his opinion concurring in the 
denial of rehearing en banc, the panel did not “conclusively 
determine[]” that California’s regulations satisfied the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.271 Rather, he explained, all the court did was 
“reject the argument that the LCFS’s ethanol provisions facially 
discriminate against out-of-state commerce.”272 The panel 
remanded the case for consideration of the challengers’ other 
arguments because the court concluded, “findings of fact and more 
proceedings in the district court were needed to determine the 
LCFS’s constitutionality.”273 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the limitations imposed by the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, states retain ample ability to enact environmental 
regulations and otherwise control the environmental effects of 
energy use and production within their borders. States potentially 
run into trouble when they seek to insulate themselves from the 
potential competitive effects by enacting potentially costly 
regulations or extend the reach of their regulatory choices to those 
in other jurisdictions. So, while states remain free to enact such 
measures, structural, constitutional limitations may discourage 
states from enacting desired policies. By some accounts, this is 
precisely what the Framers would have intended: forcing each 
jurisdiction to bear the competitive consequences of its own policy 
choices.274  
Concerned that interjurisdictional competition may discourage 
too many states from acting, some commentators believe the 
Supreme Court is too rigid in its application of these constraints, 
particularly in the environmental context.275 Given recent trends in 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these commentators 
may get their wish for less stringent enforcement of the doctrine. In 
recent years, several Justices have expressed dissatisfaction with 
the doctrine, and the Court appears ready to back away from at 
least some aspects of the doctrine, such as the bar on 
extraterritoriality and the balancing of in-state benefits against 
burdens on interstate commerce under the Pike test.276  
How state climate and energy polices fare in court will 
ultimately depend on which path the Supreme Court takes. Strict 
enforcement of the doctrine as it stands could trim the protectionist 
trappings from many a state’s RPS program and limit California’s 
aggressive experimentation with regulation of fuels. A more 
relaxed approach—potentially driven by the Court’s most 
conservative Justices—would give states greater ability to adopt 
the energy and climate policies of their choice, even at the expense 
of out-of-state producers. The fates of state climate change policies 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause are tied together. 
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